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BOOK REVIEWS
THE SUPREME COURT: CONSTITUTIONAL REVOLUTION IN RETRO-
SPECT. By Bernard Schwartz. New York: The Ronald Press Com-
pany. 1957. Pp. vii, 429. $6.50.
When this book was published its author was professor of law and
director of the Institute of Comparative Law at New York University
School of Law. In the interval he has had his day on the front pages of
the nation's newspapers-and a day it was such as comes to few pro-
fessors of law no matter how venerable in the teaching profession or how
long and how much esteemed by bench and bar.
The day of Bernard Schwartz in the news, or more accurately days
since he was in the frontpage headlines for most of a fortnight, came in
February, 1958, in the course of the investigation of the House Sub-
committee on Oversight into the conduct of the independent regulatory
commissions and agencies. The 34 year-old law teacher set a storm
blowing when he made a series of startling charges to the general effect
that the subcommittee, because of strong pressures, was sitting on a
complex of scandalous situations in which it ought to be probing reso-
lutely. After an internal staff report of the subcommittee was released
in the press Bernard Schwartz was discharged from his position as the
subcommittee's chief counsel.
Testifying before the subcommittee concerning his alarming charges,
Schwartz made the original sworn public statements about Richard A.
Mack's financial dealings with the attorney for an applicant for a Federal
Communications Commission license and channel assignment to operate
a Miami, Florida television station. His other testimony included state-
ments which opened up to general view the Sherman Adams-Bernard
Goldfine friendship-influence case. There is much more that could be
said about Bernard Schwartz's tempestuous sojourn with the House Sub-
committee on Oversight, which followed, as it happened, service as spe-
cial consultant to the Second Hoover Commission and to the House Sub-
committee on Government Information. But the foregoing summary is
enough to demonstrate that the author of this study of the Supreme Court
is no isolated academician, remote from the times in which he lives.
For our purposes then so much for Bernard Schwartz other than as
the writer of this book. As its author he must be put down at once as
one of the not too large company of professors of law who really know
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a great deal about the United States Supreme Court in its long sweep of
history. To be sure many legal scholars know the Supreme Court's work
in one or two or at most a few fields. Not many have either the overall
view of constitutional history or the grasp of detail, case by case, that
Schwartz possesses. For although he centers on the work of the Su-
preme Court since 1937, there are frequent references to guideposts
erected by Marshall, Story and Taney, by Holmes, Brandeis, Hughes
and others who have gone before. He writes about the past two decades
but he illuminates them with flashes of light that come down from the
Court's earliest days.
The purpose of this New York University professor could hardly
be better. Noting that popular interest in the Supreme Court has never
been greater, he hopes to add to the information of the people about the
institution. For he believes deeply that "the work of the Supreme Court
is too significant to be the domain of a relatively few legal specialists"
and that the "constitutional law dispensed by the Supreme Court is much
more than the private preserve of the legal profession."1
The author begins his enlargement of a fifth of a century of Su-
preme Court history in 1937 because in that year, as he sees it, "there
occurred a veritable revolution in the Court's jurisprudence."' Whether
it is fair to say that the revolution took place within the span of that one
year, certainly 1937 was a memorable year. Early in that year came the
so-called "court packing" bill of President Franklin D. Roosevelt. Be-
fore the proposal was voted down, Chief Justice Hughes and Justices
Van Devanter and Brandeis went before the Senate Judiciary Committee
to testify against it. While the legislative battle raged, the change of
sides by Justice Roberts enabled the 5-to-4 decision of the Supreme Court
in West Coast Hotel Co. v. ParrishP to reverse in effect the much criti-
cized 5-to-4 state minimum wage law decision handed down in the pre-
ceding term in Morehead v. United States ex rel. Tipaldo.4 It was also,
and perhaps this was the most notable single event of all, the year of the
departure from the Supreme Court of Justice Van Devanter and his re-
placement by Justice Black. So 1937 saw the break in the lineup of the
pre-Roosevelt court, and the start of the more modern court of which
Justice Black is now senior member with twenty-one years of service.
Something had to begin to happen in 1937 or soon thereafter. As
the author says, by 1937 there had occurred "perhaps the outstanding
1. SCHWARTZ, THE SUPREME COURT: CONSTITUTIONAL REVOLUTION IN RETROSPECT
iv (1957) (hereinafter cited as SCHWARTZ).
2. Ibid.
3. 300 U.S. 379 (1937).
4. 298 U.S. 587 (1936).
BOOK REVIEWS
example in our constitutional history of judicial lag."' In the three years
from the latter part of 1933 (the year of Franklin D. Roosevelt's first
inauguration) to the middle of 1936 acts or parts of acts of Congress, in-
cluding several of the key elements of the New Deal, were declared un-
constitutional in twelve decisions. Changes in outlook came with changes
in the Court's personnel, beginning with the appointment of justice Black
in 1937 and followed, in short intervals, by the appointments of justices
Reed, Frankfurter and Douglas. The pre-1937 Court had struck broadly
at congressional attempts to maintain fair industrial and labor standards
and to use the power to tax and to appropriate for the promotion of the
general welfare. The post-1937 Court, as shaped by the first Roosevelt
appointments, moved away from what Schwartz calls "the apogee of the
doctrine of judicial supremacy"' and began to allow Congress greater
latitude in its treatment of national problems. This change with its
later modifications and adaptations forms the substance of Bernard
Schwartz's study.
In the two decades since 1937 the Supreme Court has had to cope
with legal aspects of World War II and many phases of the Cold War
that has extended over approximately two-thirds of the period. Schwartz
describes these controversies and discusses the Supreme Court's handling
of them as well as the Court's relationship to the office of the President,
and to Congress and the administrative agencies, and the function of the
Court as referee between the states and the federal government. Finally
he takes up the record which the high tribunal has written during this
period as the protector of the Bill of Rights.
Opposed to the policy of nullification of congressional acts in the
early days of the New Deal, the author is still opposed to it in the second
decade of his score of years. He generally sides with Congress, and, like
Justice Frankfurter, only most reluctantly joins in a judicial upsetting
of a legislative act. He sees the apparent incongruity of the Smith Act
of 1940 "in a country whose first article of faith is the principle of full
and free discussion." 7 He makes it clear that "the Smith Act is aimed,
not so much at seditious acts, as at seditious teaching or advocacy," that
it "restricts not so much deeds as words," and that "as such, it consti-
tutes a clear limitation upon the freedom of speech and of the press
guaranteed by the First Amendment."8 But he does not concern himself
with desirability or even necessity. And so he does not say that the Smith
5. ScnvATz 10.
6. Id. at 12.
7. Id. at 308.
8. Ibid.
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right of free speech, like other constitutional rights, must be reconciled
with the other rights safeguarded by the organic instrument; it can be
restrained where necessary for the preservation of other freedoms essen-
tial to a democracy and guaranteed by our Constitution."'
Schwartz finds that broad principles have dominated the Court's
work and that is why he says it is possible to analyze the high tribunal's
jurisprudence from an institutional point of view without more than
passing reference to the individual personalities of the Justices. The
Court as a whole, though not all its members to the same degree, "has
accepted the implications inherent in the constitutional revolution of
1937."" ° With this has gone "more internal consistency to the work of
the high tribunal than is often realized."" But in a final chapter called
"Anatomy and Pathology," he gathers some of his dislikes within a total
result that he finds largely supportable. He notes a too easy willingness,
at least on the part of some Justices, to overrule precedents, for while he
recognizes readily enough the necessity for accommodation to change, he
underscores at the same time the indispensability of certainty. 2 The
author is disturbed, too, by the increasing use of the dissenting opinion
in the last twenty years. He points out that during the early days of the
New Deal there was a basic cleavage within the Court. Yet during this
period dissenting opinions were written in only 13 to 19 per cent of the
cases.' 8 In recent years, "even though there has been no such fundamental
split in philosophy on the bench,"' 4 the percentage has been much higher.
He quotes statistics which show that in the terms 1943 to 1956 dissents
were delivered in the majority of cases and that in the two terms of 1951
and 1952 dissents were filed in 80 or 7i per cent of the cases.'" The
increase in dissents, he observes, "has been accompanied by a similar
proliferation of concurring opinions"' 6 where disagreements not in result
but in reasoning are aired. This inclination to dissent and concur dis-
turbs him because "what detracts from the esteem in which the highest
tribunal is held cannot but reflect advergely upon the law throughout the
land."' 7
Act contains unconstitutional provisions. He puts it this way: "The
9. Ibid.
10. SCHWARTZ 344.
11. Ibid.
12: "Without certainty, the law becomes not a chart to govern conduct, but a game
of chance; with .only certainty, the law is as the still waters in which there are only
stagnation and death." SCHHWv.ATz 346.
13. ScHWAR z 357.
14. Ibid.
15. Ibid.
16. Ibid.
17. SCHWARTZ 354.
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A particularly noteworthy section of the book is that which deals
with the citizen who happens to be a Negro and equal protection of his
rights under the law. Here Bernard Schwartz puts the basic public ques-
tions as follows: "Has the high bench, as has been charged, distorted
the Constitution, in accordance with the personal prepossessions of its
members, to deprive the states of their sovereign powers over their
education systems? Are the Court's decisions abolishing segregation in
public schools based upon a cavalier disregard of settled law and a judi-
cial attitude that regard for precedents and authorities is obsolete, that
words no longer mean what they have always meant to the Court, and
that the Court itself knows no fixed principles ?,,s
To answer these questions, Schwartz undertakes a consideration of
the relevant constitutional provisions-the thirteenth, fourteenth and
fifteenth amendments. Part of the trouble, he finds, is that these post-
Civil War changes in the Constitution, freeing the Negro, giving him the
benefits of citizenship and granting him the right to vote, still are not
accepted fully in the South. To the South the ratification of these amend-
ments was coerced as part of the terms of the peace. But ratified they
were and they are as much parts of the Constitution as any other part.
If they "override the powers reserved to the states under the Tenth
Amendment,"19 the author sees no support for defiance. They were
adopted long after the tenth amendment and according to settled rules
of construction take precedence over the earlier general provision.
After reviewing cases dealing with voting, separate and restricted
accommodations and other aspects of racial discrimination, the author
arrives at the 1954 public school desegregation case, Brown. v. Board of
Education."0 Noting that Chief Justice Warren's opinion, supported
though it was unanimously, "strikes at the core of the South's way of
life-a way of life that has roots far deeper than the actions of legisla-
tures and courts," Schwartz concedes frankly that the decision's extreme
critics are not likely to be "persuaded by any legal arguments that the
present writer can make."'" Yet he feels others must speak up for the
Court since "in singling out the Supreme Court as the cause of the de-
struction of the interracial pattern developed by it, the South is letting its
natural desire for a scapegoat obscure the real origin of its present dif-
ficulties."2 2
18. Id. at 263.
19. Id. at 264.
20. 347 U.S. 483 (1954), 349 U.S. 294 (1955).
21. SCHVARTZ 273.
22. Ibid.
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Whatever these difficulties of the South are, there is a larger con-
sideration in Bernard Schwartz's eyes. In an especially strong passage he
writes:
One point needs to be emphasized in any consideration of
the constitutional storm stirred up by the desegregation ruling
of the highest tribunal, and it has nothing to do with the merits
of that ruling as a matter of constitutional law. Successful de-
fiance by the South of the decision of the Supreme Court will
result in a far more radical change in our constitutional system
than even the most extreme critic of the Court asserts was
brought about by the Brown decision. A constitutional system
such as ours, governed by a written organic instrument, must of
necessity be a Law State par excellence. That such a system can
flourish only in a society imbued with a legal spirit and trained
to reverence the law is as certain as any conclusion of political
speculation can be. For such a system properly to operate,
there must be some machinery set up to ensure that the provi-
sions of the Constitution are adhered to. A Constitution whose
provisions are enforced only by the voluntary adherence of
those subject thereto is a mere paper instrument ...
• . . Indeed, respect for the Court's decisions is the sine
qua non of our structure; draw out this particular bolt, and the
machinery falls to pieces. To make even one exception to the
principle that the Supreme Court alone is the trustee of the law
is to take the fatal first step toward abrogation of the rule of
law . . . Of what importance is it to say the states are pro-
hibited from doing certain acts, if the states recognize no legiti-
mate authority to decide whether an act done is a prohibited
act? If the states alone have the right to decide on their own
powers, does any Constitution remain? Does not the power of
the states become absolute and uncontrolled? Can anyone talk
to them of transgressing their constitutional powers, when they
deny that anyone has a right to judge of those powers but
themselves ?23
This is a good point at which to turn back to one of the author's
major concerns, expressed on his very first page-the flood of denuncia-
tion that has rained on the Supreme Court in recent years. For while he
favors fruitful criticism, based on understanding, he is alarmed at how
far the pendulum has swung from veneration of the Supreme Court to
23. SCHaWARTZ 273-75.
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vituperation. He hopes therefore to make a contribution of his own to
restoring the Court to its former place of respect and esteem.
With a book such as Schwartz's, carefully written and yet bold, on
subjects and controversies of universal importance, the temptation of
independent comment is irresistible. In succumbing the writer wishes to
identify the following observations as such.
First, controversy is inevitable in a self-governing democracy, and
the Supreme Court, as one of the three coordinate branches of the Fed-
eral Government, is certain to be sharply criticized on occasion just as
the President and Congress are at other times. From pre-Civil War
days-indeed from Marbury v. Madison-those who have not liked Su-
preme Court rulings have denounced the judges who made them and have
worked actively to bring about reversal.
Second, the general rule of allowing the legislative body wide scope
is sound, but excesses and abuses will arise and when they do the Supreme
Court must stamp them as such or it is no longer "supreme." The Smith
Act of 1940, as applied, came into direct conflict with the First Amend-
ment, and unless the conflicting legislative limitation is demonstrably
urgent, the guaranties of free speech and free press, must take precedence.
This is the essence of the Supreme Court's modification in 1957 in Yates
v. United States2' of the Vinson Court's approval of the Smith Act in
Dennis v. U. S.2" It is a strong modification, if not an outright reversal,
for which the country may be profoundly grateful to the Warren Court.
Third, the life of the law is its growth and the dissents of today may
point the way of tomorrow. It is just as important upon occasion that
conflicts be aired as it is that at other times unanimity be preserved. If
the question is close in the eyes of the Justices and the positions are com-
plex, an adult people are entitled to know these facts and to take them
into account in the forming of an intelligent public opinion.
Fourth, the Civil War amendments and the circumstances surround-
ing their passage are part of the trouble in the desegregation controversy
but had they not been enacted when they were, it would have been neces-
sary to have submitted and ratified them later. How fortunate we are
today that we have them to apply in the existing situation and that we
are not just now beginning a campaign of popular education for their
incorporation into the Constitution for application at some future time.
24. 354 U.S. 298 (1957).
25. 341 U.S. 494 (1951).
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For in the small world in which we live we no longer have unlimited time
to demonstrate that we actually believe the ideals that we profess.
IRVING DILLIARDt
STUDIES IN JURISPRUDENCE: V, FREE MAN VERSUS His GOVERN-
MENT. Edited by Arthur L. Harding. Dallas: Southern Methodist
University Press. 1958. Pp. xi, 117. $3.00.
"Free Man Versus His Government" resounds with echoes of a call
to revolution, but a brief reflection on the Latin divider variously abbre-
viated v. and vs. brings apprehension of the frequently dull form of de-
bate called litigation. This title identifies four essays from the 1957
Conference on Law in Society presented by the Southwestern Legal
Foundation and the Southern Methodist University School of Law.' No
revolutionary tocsins sound among them or in any of them. Motions
for continuance and settlement negotiations, with even a few expressions
of expectation that settlement will be on mutually advantageous terms,
are more frequent than requests for peremptory instructions or notices
of appeal.
Professor Beutel2 on "Freedom of Political Association" does appeal
from decisions supporting exculpatory oaths and decisions holding that
the federal government cannot protect freedom of political assembly for
a non-federal purpose from private interference. Professor Harding'
on !"Freedom to Use Property" is content to assert that private property
is here to stay. He indicates that the "bundle of rights" has been re-
sorted and new sticks have been added in such a way as to recognize
more economic values and make them more valuable by achieving a bal-
ance of social interests that works to enhance freedom. The manner here
is less of the indictment or brief and more of the historical survey.
Professor Stumpf4 on "Freedom to Learn" comes to three opinions
of truth in the realm of values. He chooses continual rational examina-
tion and restatement, based on faith in absolute truth and skepticism of
t Irving Dilliard is an editorial writer for the St. Louis Post-Dispatch and from
1949 to 1957 was editor of its editorial page. Among his publications are Mr. Justice
Brandeis: Great American and The Spirit of Liberty: The Addresses and Papers of
Learned Hand.
1. The present volume is the fifth of a series which was begun in 1954.
2. Frederick K. Beutel, Professor of Law, University of Nebraska.
3. Arthur L. Harding, Professor of Law, Southern Methodist University.
4. Samuel Enoch Stumpf, Professor of Philosophy, Vanderbilt University.
